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This thesis has tested the Farm-Retail price transmission for Norwegian salmon exports to 
France. By the use of public data for farm level price in Norway, export level price in 
Norway, retail level price in France, transportation costs and currency exchange rates the 
price transmission for the Norway-France value chain has been investigated. Tests of 
asymmetric price transmission were also conducted. Results show that the farm-export 
linkage is stronger than the export-retail linkage with respect to the price pass through. 
Both transportation costs and currency exchange rates significantly influences the price 
transmission elasticity. There is evidence of asymmetric price transmission in the value 
chain. The price changes at the export level respond more to a decrease in the farm level 
price than to an increase. The Salmon Agreement between Norway and the EU 































Denne oppgave har testet pris transmisjonen på verdikjeden fra lakseoppdretter i Norge til 
butikk markedet i Frankrike. Ved hjelp av oppdrettspris, eksportpris, butikkpris, 
transportkostnader og valutakurser har pris transmisjonen langs verdikjeden blitt 
undersøkt. Det er blitt utført tester for sjekke for asymmetrisk pris transmisjon. 
Resultatene viser at oppdretter-eksportør leddet er sterkere enn eksportør-butikk leddet 
med hensyn til fullverdig pris overføring. Både transportkostnader og valutakurser har 
signifikant påvirkning på pris transmisjonselastisiteten. Det er bevis for asymmetrisk pris 
transmisjon i verdikjeden. Prisendringene på eksportleddet reagerer mer på en nedgang i 
oppdrettsprisen enn på en oppgang. Lakseavtalen mellom Norhe og EU har en signifikant 

























Nøkkelord: Laks, Norge-Frankrike, pris transmisjon og asymmetri 
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“Whenever oil prices fall, there is always this stickiness in gasoline prices on the way 
down. You never see this stickiness on the way up.” 
Ed Rothschild, energy expert at Citizen Action. New York Times, (Wald) July 2, 1990. 
 
In agricultural economics the topic price transmission has been subject to considerable 
attention (see e.g., Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2002a) and Goodwin and Harper 
(2000)). Nevertheless, research addressing this issue in relation to fish markets has been 
scarce, the couple of exceptions being Asche and Sebulonsen (1998) and Kinnucan and 
Myrland (2000). The scope of this thesis will be to apply empirical methods of estimating 
asymmetric price transmission to the case of Atlantic salmon exported from Norway to 
France. 
 
A brief review of the literature on asymmetric price transmission provides evidence of 
miscellaneous methods and approaches applied on the topic. Outside of agriculture, 
gasoline and fuel markets have been tested for asymmetric price transmission (see e.g., 
Borenstein et al. (1997) and Karrenbrock (1991)), while Balke and Fomby (1997) and 
Enders and Granger (1998) find evidence of asymmetric adjustment between interest 
rates of different maturities. Also, Peltzman (2000), in an extensive study of price 
transmission for several hundred producer and consumer goods in the US, found that 
fewer number of firms lead to more asymmetry and that more concentration lead to less 
asymmetry. 
 
In agricultural economics most attempts to test for the presence of asymmetric price 
transmission have been based on a method for detecting irreversible supply reactions 
developed by Wolffram (1971) and later adopted by Houck (1977) and Ward (1982). 
Furthermore, Kinnucan and Forker (1987) tested for the asymmetry in farm-retail 
transmission for dairy products in the United States, based on Houck’s model for 
estimating nonreversible functions. By using a threshold cointegration model that 
permitted asymmetric adjustments to positive and negative price shocks, Goodwin and 





There is considered to be a global market for salmon. Research done by Asche and 
Sebulonsen (1998), Asche et al. (1999) and Asche et al.(2002) show that there is a global 
market for salmon, including salmon from all major producers at the export level. 
Guttormsen (2002) found that in the global market price levels differ. For instance, the 
prices are higher in Japan than in the EU and in the United States, but prices for each 
species and product follow a long-term pattern. 
 
During the last few years there has been a controversy both in the media and in the 
industry over the salmon prices. The price level on salmon made a significant shift from 
very high prices around 2000, to relatively low prices the following years up until last year 
(2006). During times of sustained pressure on margins, the salmon farming industry looks 
for answers to underlying mechanisms behind the low prices and profitability. “...the 
presence of asymmetric price transmission is often considered for policy purposes to be 
evidence of market failure” Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2002b, p. 1). Bearing these 
facts in mind, this thesis will to some extent shed light on the situation regarding 
Norwegian export of salmon to France. 
 
According to the Norwegian Seafood Export Council (NSEC) 2006, France is the most 
important market for Atlantic salmon, followed by Denmark (although it is largely a transit 
country for Norwegian seafood on its way to the EU), Poland, Great Britain and Russia. 
These five countries accounted for over 54 % of total exports, compared to 48 % the 
previous year. Due to the relative importance of France in the global salmon market this 
market can play a representative role among other importing countries. Charron and 
Richardson (2001) state that France is indicative of trends in terms of among other prices, 
consumer behaviour and potential market development in Europe. 
 
By adopting a model developed by Kinnucan and Myrland (2001), this thesis will develop 
a model that investigates price transmission for Norwegian salmon exported to France. 
Asymmetric price transmission will also be tested for by using a model developed by 
Houck (1977). By using monthly time series, data for fish farmer price in Norway, export 
price to France and retail price in France, the price linkages at these three levels in the 
value chain for fresh Atlantic salmon, will be investigated. The model will also incorporate 
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transportation costs and currency exchange rates to see whether these factors affect the 
price mechanism. 
 
In July 1997 a Salmon Agreement (SA) between Norway and the European Union raised 
the export tax on Norwegian salmon entering the EU from 0,75 % to 3,00 %. The 
proceeds of the levy were used by Norway to fund generic marketing of Atlantic salmon 
(Brittain and Bull, 1997). Besides the financing of the generic marketing, the SA included 
two important elements, namely a minimum price level on salmon imported to the EU, and 
an indicative ceiling on annual growth. Although an important issue when discussing 
Norwegian salmon export to France, this particular aspect has been investigated by other 
researchers (see e.g. Asche et al., 1998; Kinnucan and Myrland, 2000; , 2002). The SA 
ended in May 2003, and its effect on the price mechanism will be measured. 
 
1.1 Problem positioning 
I will narrow my focus in this thesis to merely looking at price transmission elasticities, so 
that the objective of the research reported in this thesis can be summed up in the 
following: 
 
To investigate the price mechanism along the retail, wholesale and farmer levels of 
the Norwegian-French salmon marketing chain. 
 
Furthermore, I will try to answer the following four questions: 
1) Are the price changes transmitted equally when prices increase and decrease? 
2) Did the SA have an effect on the price transmission elasticities? 
3) Does currency exchange rate elasticity influence the price mechanism? 
4) To which extent does transportation costs have an impact on French retail prices? 
 
My incentive for addressing these specific issues is while the asymmetry aspect has 
undergone relatively thorough research, asymmetric price transmission on salmon has 
not been subject to much attention. As such, I hope that my effort will provide an 
illuminating contribution. Even though long-term transportation contracts to some extent 
can decrease the industry’s level of uncertainty regarding production/marketing costs, 
there still are exogenous factors influencing the marginal cost of transportation. Fuel 
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costs, rate of interest and time costs, all contribute to explaining the level of transportation 
costs. Thus, transportation costs are essential when cost accounting and managerial 
control is focused in the salmon industry. Albeit Norway has a geographical competitive 
advantage over Chile in the EU-market, the situation for Scotland and Ireland is even 
more favourable.  
From an industrial point of view the fact that most of the Norwegian salmon is exported 
makes1 the strength of the Norwegian currency relative to other currencies a critical 
success factor in a competitive market. In conclusion, an accurate assessment and 
quantification of the impact transportation costs and exchange rate currencies has on 
retail prices in France will hopefully provide a helpful knowledge to the salmon industry. 
1.2 Overview of thesis  
In chapter 2 a brief summary of relevant theory and a review of literature are presented. 
The chapter is divided into three sections, namely asymmetric price transmission, mark-
up and exchange rates. This chapter represents the theoretical spine of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 gives a description of my empirical data and comments on the collection of 
these. Some notes on how I have processed the data will also be presented here. In 
addition I will briefly describe Norwegian salmon exports in general, as well as the French 
market. 
 
In chapter 4 I will proceed with focus on the econometric models I use in the thesis and 
the formulation of them. The development and explanation of the structural model for 
price transmission analyses will be addressed in detail. This is supplemented with a 
specification of the test of asymmetric price transmission. Chapter 4 is concluded with 
some remarks on the interpretation of the results. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the analyses I did and the results I found. An overview of the 
variables used is presented, and the results of the asymmetry and price transmission 
analyses are presented in tables. The results are thoroughly discussed and explained. 
 
                                            
1 Norway produced 597.000 tons of salmon in 2006, of which 572.600 (~96%) was exported (Source: Tall 
og fakta 2006. Norwegian Seafood Export Council (2006) 
  
 12 
Finally, in chapter 6 a brief summary of the thesis will be given, along with some 
concluding comments on my main findings and the implications of these. 
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2 Price transmission 
 
The price mechanism is the means by which resources are allocated and re-allocated 
within a market-based economic system. The twin forces of market demand and supply 
determine the equilibrium price and this leads to the factor inputs being allocated in both 
goods and factor markets2. The law of demand states that there is an inverse relationship 
between the price of a good and the demand for a good. As prices fall one can see an 
expansion of demand. Contrarily, if prices rise one can expect to see a contraction of 
demand. The fact that prices change over time makes it essential for the agents at the 
different levels of the salmon marketing chain to understand the underlying mechanisms. 
In the short term the price may be affected by both deterministic factors like seasonality 
and stochastic factors such as disease outbreak and algal blooms Guttormsen (2002). 
Long-term effects are usually already reflected in the price through forecasting. In an 
efficient economic market individual firms can reduce risk through hedging and by trading 
futures (Brealey and Myers, 2003). Of late some financial institutions have started to offer 
currency exchange rate hedging for Norwegian exporters. The rather strong relationship 
between salmon prices and share prices for the salmon farming companies indicate that 
the financial world focuses more on short-term price movements than on long-term 
fundamentals. 
 
However, markets do not usually adjust immediately to equilibrium, and that is basically 
because of transaction costs. This includes in general costs of obtaining information about 
the market and costs of finding a marketplace to transact the business (Carman, 1997). 
Moreover, when a commodity is internationally traded, its price in one country cannot be 
independent of its price in another country. In the extreme case the Law of One Price, will 
hold: “If there were no obstacles to trade and no transport costs, the Law of One Price 
implies that the price of a given commodity will be the same all over the world” (Begg et 
al., 2000, p. 136). Without trade barriers3 and transport costs, suppliers sell in the market 
with the highest price but consumers purchase in the market with lowest price. The 
commodity can simultaneously be traded in two countries only if its price is the same in 




both markets. If there were no barriers to trade, one would expect that prices in the 
different trading countries follow a similar pattern over time, due to the arbitrage 
opportunities that would otherwise exist. This is the essence of many market definitions in 
economics. Stigler (1969), for instance, defines market as the area within which the price 
of a commodity tends to uniformity, allowance being made for transportation costs. 
Analyses omitting transportation costs from the price-linkage function can lead to 
specification errors (see e.g., Haigh and Bryant, 2001), while treating transportation costs 
as constant could tend to produce biased price transmission elasticity estimates (e.g., 
Asche, 2001)  
 
Stigler’s definition corresponds with the Law of One Price which states that in conditions 
of perfect competition the price of a commodity in one geographical market is equal to the 
price in another geographical market and the cost of transportation. Imagine two markets 
d and x. The cost of transportation from d to x is written C , where xd 0 1xd dC Pβ β= + . Then 
the price in market x is expressed as follows: 
 
(1)     x dP P Cxd= +  
 
However, empirically this relationship seldom holds, as the cost of transportation may or 
may not be unique. In addition, perfect information does not exist in the real world. Price 
differences between the various levels in the vertical chain are called marketing margins 
(in the literature also referred to as vertical price spreads or mark-ups) (Carman, 1997).   
2.1 Asymmetric price transmission 
 
Asymmetric price transmission has been a subject of considerable attention in agricultural 
economics. Asymmetric price transmission is not only important because it may point to 
gaps in economic theory, but also because its presence is often considered for policy 
purposes to be evidence of market failure Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2002a). 
Price theory is one of the foundations of neo-classical economics. Within this paradigm, 
flexible prices are responsible for efficient resource allocation and price transmission 
integrates markets vertically and horizontally. Economists who study market efficiency 
                                                                                                                                                
3 The European Union’s Single Market Act is an attempt to remove all barriers to trade between the member 
countries of the EU. 
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therefore investigate price transmission processes. In the classical free-trade model with 
zero transportation costs, the international price transmission is implicitly assumed to be 
perfect. This conjecture is dubious according to Bredahl, Meyers and Collins (1979, p. 
58), who state:  
 
“The assumption of perfect price transmission is a convenient simplification but has a 
profound impact on the calculated elasticities and raises serious questions about their 
applicability to the real world” 
 
Moreover, asymmetry can have important implications for policymakers. Since it is 
commonly assumed that asymmetric price transmission is caused by market power, 
empirical evidence of asymmetry is often claimed to justify Government intervention.  
The very same logic apply for other markets, for instance the gasoline market, where 
retail gasoline prices often fluctuate more widely than consumer prices in general. Some 
analysts and politicians have criticized these retail gasoline price movements, alleging 
that they do not respond symmetrically to price changes at earlier stages of the marketing 
chain. In particular, they believe that retail gasoline prices do not reflect decreases in oil 




2.1.1 Types of asymmetry 
Two basic types of asymmetry are depicted in figures 1 and 2 in the context of price 
transmission, where a price (pout) is assumed to depend on another price (pin) that either 
increases or decreases at a specific point in time.4 In figure 1, the magnitude of the 
response by pout to a change in pin depends on the direction of this change. In figure 2, the 
speed of the response by pout depends on the direction of the change in pin.  
                                            
4 Asymmetry is closely related to the issue of price rigidity or ’stickiness’. See e.g., Meyer and von Cramon-







Figure 1 – Asymmetric price transmission – magnitude 
Clearly, combinations of the two fundamental asymmetries are conceivable. In figure 3, 
an increase in pin takes two periods (t1 and t2) to be fully transmitted to pout. The 
corresponding transmission of a decrease in pin is asymmetric with respect to both speed 
and magnitude because it requires three periods (t1, t2 and t3) and is not full. 
outP
inP




Figure 2 – Asymmetric price transmission – speed 
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Price transmission, and thus symmetry, can be vertical or spatial (horizontal). As an 
example of vertical symmetry, farmers and consumers often complain that increases in 
farm prices are more fully and rapidly transmitted to the wholesale and retail levels than 
are similar decreases in farm prices. An example of spatial asymmetry would be a rise in 
the US wheat price causing a more pronounced reaction in Canadian wheat prices than a 























Figure 5 – Negative asymmetric price transmission 
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Following a convention employed by Peltzman (2000), asymmetry can be either positive 
or negative. If pout reacts more fully or rapidly to an increase in pin than to a decrease, the 
asymmetry is termed ‘positive’ (figure 4). Correspondingly, ‘negative’ asymmetry denotes 
a situation in which pout reacts more fully or rapidly to a decrease in pin than to an increase 
(figure 5). This convention can be misleading if interpreted in a normative fashion; if pin 
and pout represent farm and retail prices for a commodity, respectively, ‘negative’ 
asymmetry is ‘good’ for the consumer, while ‘positive’ asymmetry is ‘bad’.  
 
2.1.2 What causes asymmetric price transmission? 
Market power: The vast majority of publications on the topic of asymmetric price 
transmission include considerations of non-competitive market structures. Response of 
retail prices to changes in wholesale or farm-level prices is generally not instantaneous 
but is instead distributed over time. It is therefore commonly asserted, in the agriculture 
sector in particular, that imperfect competition allows middlemen to make use of market 
power (Kinnucan and Forker, 1987). This market power is often expected to lead to 
positive asymmetry. Hence, it is expected that increases in input prices, which reduce 
marketing margins will be transmitted faster and more completely than decreases 
because of market power (Karrenbrock, 1991). Ward (1982) suggests that market power 
can lead to negative asymmetry if oligopolists are reluctant to risk losing market shares by 
increasing prices. On the other hand, Bailey & Brorsen (1989), consider market power 
leading to positive asymmetry. If a firm believes that no competitor will match a price 
increase but all will match a price cut, positive asymmetry will result. Otherwise, if the firm 
conjectures that all firms will match an increase but none will match a price cut, negative 
symmetry will result. Hence, it is not clear a priori whether market power will lead to 
positive or negative asymmetry (Bailey and Brorsen, 1989). 
 
The presence of imperfect information has led Borenstein et al. (1997) to assume that 
downward stickiness of retail prices in an oligopolistic environment will lead to positive 
asymmetry. Assuming imperfect information about the prices charged by other firms, the 
old output price, after a change in the input price, offers a natural focal point. While cost 
increases will lead to an immediate increase in output prices, because retail margins are 
squeezed, cost decreases won’t lead to immediate output price decreases because firms 
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will maintain prices above the competitive level as long as their sales remain above a 
threshold level (Borenstein et al., 1997). 
 
Balke et al. (1998) also consider oligopolistic firms engaged in an informal collusion, 
rather than a cartel, to maintain higher profits. Because of the importance of reputation 
under such conditions, asymmetric price adjustments can arise. For example, in the 
presence of input price increases all firms will quickly adjust output prices upwards to 
signal their competitors that collusion will be maintained. However, if input prices fall, 
firms will wait to lower output prices to avoid signalling an undermining of the unspoken 
agreement. 
 
Bedrossian and Moschos (1998) stress profitability considerations, suggesting that 
different levels of profitability among firms within an industry can lead to asymmetry. It is 
suggested that a relatively profitable firm can more easily take the risk5 of delaying a price 
adjustment following a decline in input prices than a firm with lower profitability, because 
of higher profits. 
 
Borenstein et al. (1997) propose that search costs faced by consumers lead to local 
monopolies that can lead, in turn, to asymmetry.  A local monopoly can arise if the costs 
of searching for a lower price are perceived to be higher than the expected profits from a 
lower price. Generally speaking, such transaction costs are hard to identify and more 
often than not omitted in price transmission analyses. 
 
Despite the great variety of hypothesised links between market power and asymmetry, 
choosing an appropriate proxy for market power still represents a major problem. It is well 
known that the commonly used concentration measures will be less than perfectly 
correlated with market power, see e.g., Capps et al. (1995).    
 
Adjustment and menu costs: Another major explanation for asymmetric price transmission 
is provided by adjustment costs. Adjustment costs arise if a firm increases or decreases 
its output or the price of its product. If these costs are asymmetric with respect to an 
                                            
5 I.e., lose customers and eventually market shares 
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increase or a decrease in output quantities and/or prices, the adjustment will be 
asymmetric. In the case of price changes, adjustment costs are also called menu costs. 
 
For the US beef market, Bailey and Brorsen (1989) show that packers, unlike feedlots, 
face significant fixed costs. So in the short-run, margins may be reduced to keep the plant 
operating. Therefore, farm prices may rise more quickly and fall more slowly, as a result 
of competition between different packers, i.e. negative symmetry. In contrast, Peltzman 
(2000) makes a case for positive asymmetry, arguing that it is easier for a firm to 
disemploy inputs in the case of an output reduction than it is to recruit new input to 
increase output. This recruitment of inputs will lead to search costs and price premium 
that skew the adjustment costs to the increasing phase. 
 
Ward (1982) points out that retailers of perishable products might hesitate to raise prices 
for fear of reduced sales, and thus, spoilage (i.e., negative symmetry). Ward’s explanation 
is challenged by Heien (1980). He argues that changing prices is less of a problem for 
perishable products than it is for those with long shelf life. For the latter higher time costs 
of changing prices and losses of goodwill are expected (for example the reprinting of price 
lists or catalogues and the cost of informing market partners). 
 
In summary, as was the case for the explanations of asymmetry in which market power is 
involved, attempts to explain asymmetric price transmission using adjustments costs can 
lead to contradictory and ambiguous results. A difference between market power and 
adjustment costs could be that while both could produce asymmetries in speed of price 
transmission, only market power is capable of leading to long lasting asymmetries in the 
magnitude of adjustment to positive and negative input price shocks. Furthermore, as 
argued by Bailey and Brorsen (1989), adjustment costs probably do not vary by location, 
so spatial asymmetric price transmission is unlikely to be caused by adjustment costs. 
 
A number of additional explanations for asymmetric price transmission have been 
proposed. Especially in agriculture, price support, often in the form of floor prices, is quite 
common. Kinnucan and Forker (1987) argue that such political intervention can lead to 
asymmetric price adjustment. If it leads wholesalers or retailers to believe that a reduction 
in farm prices will only be temporary, it will trigger government intervention, while an 
increase in farm prices is more likely to be permanent. 
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Kinnucan & Forker (1987) mention the potential of asymmetric price transmission in the 
marketing margin model developed by Gardner (1975). In this model, the farm-level price 
spread depends on shifts in retail-level demand and shifts in farm-level supply. Gardner 
deduces a stronger impact of retail-level demand shifts than of farm-level supply shifts. 
Hence, an asymmetric distribution of either demand or supply shifts would also lead to 
observable asymmetric price transmission. 
 
Bailey and Brorsen (1989) show that asymmetric price adjustment can arise due to 
asymmetric information. If larger firms benefit from economies of scale in information 
gathering, asymmetric information between competing firms is the result. The authors 
also point out that asymmetries in price series data can be the result of a distorted price 
reporting process. 
 
Inventory management is sometimes proposed as a possible cause of asymmetric price 
transmission. Reagan and Weitzman (1982) argue that in periods of low demand firms will 
adjust produced quantity and increase inventory rather than decrease output prices. In 
periods of high demand, on the other hand, firms will increase prices. In combination with 
asymmetric perceived costs of low and high inventory stocks, because of the fear of a 
stock out, this would lead to positive asymmetry. 
 
While this list of potential explanations for asymmetry is probably not exhaustive, the 
general impression is of a bouquet of often-casual explanations, with each being able to 













Following the notion cited in Carman (1997), mark-up  is also referred to in the literature 
as vertical price spreads and marketing margins. For many years, social and political 
institutions have been concerned about food price behaviour, and, as a consequence, the 
behaviour of marketing margins, which have been used as an index of economic 
efficiency, bargaining power and market transparency, among other things. The term 
marketing margin refers to the part of the consumer’s food expenditure which is absorbed 
by the food-marketing sector. Thus, marketing costs are distinguished from production 
costs. The point of division is typically defined as the farm-gate. Expenses occurring 
before the farm-gate are production costs, while expenses occurring beyond the farm-
gate are marketing costs (Briz and de Felipe, 1997). In primitive economies where 
producers and consumers deal directly with one another, the market equilibrium is 
determined by producers receiving the same price as is paid by consumers. But in 
modern economies, which are based upon specialization of labour, marketing systems 
have developed. The middlemen in the marketing agencies typically operate under 
conditions that are considerably less than competitive. The crux of the discussion at this 
point is that the providers of marketing services must receive some compensation (or 
some margin of payment) if those services are to be available. 
 
According to Goodwin (1994), an agricultural marketing system typically performs three 
basic functions: concentration, equalization and dispersion. The initial marketing function, 
concentration, pulls together a volume of product sufficient for the other two functions to 
be efficiently performed. Examples of marketing businesses that the function of 
concentration would include fish auction markets and slaughter processing units. 
Once the function of concentration has been accomplished, the function of equalization 
can begin. Some of the equalizing activities performed by the agricultural marketing 
system include sorting, grading, processing and packaging. Examples of marketing 
businesses that engage in equalizing activities include filet production fish packing, 
canning and freezing. Upon completion of the equalization function, the agricultural 
marketing function of dispersion may be undertaken. This function includes activities such 
as transportation, warehousing, wholesaling and retailing. 
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Probably the easiest type of marketing margin to understand is the constant cost per unit 
marketing margin. This marketing margin tends to add a constant monetary value per unit 
of product to the price received by the basic producer. This constant cost per unit type of 
marketing margin is fairly typical, for example, for fresh fruits and vegetables. One of the 
reasons for the existence of the constant cost per unit type of marketing margin is that the 
vast majority of the costs faced by the marketing agencies tend to be variable costs. The 
major costs for marketing fresh fruits and vegetables, for example, are harvesting labour, 
grading and sorting labour, packaging materials, and transportation, all of which vary 
almost perfectly with the volume of product handled. Thus, in the cost structure for 
marketing with respect to average variable costs and average total costs, the two would 
be almost identical. Marginal costs likewise would follow a similar pattern, implying that 
each added unit of product marketed would add essentially a constant amount to the total 
marketing cost. 
 
Another type of marketing margin is the constant percentage of retail price. This type of 
marketing margin is fairly typical for products for which the marketing process involves 
very large fixed investments and substantial economies of scale. An example of the 
constant percentage marketing margin is provided by dairy products. Some studies have 
shown that direct-cost pricing (mark-up coefficient on raw fish) is a common practise in 
the fish industry (Guillotreau and Le Grel, 2001).  
 
There is also the increasing cost per unit type of marketing margin, which is fairly typical 
for products for which marketing firms face significant levels of fixed investment costs, but 
have substantial variable costs as well. While economies of scale may be available, most 
of these scale economies are realized at relatively low level of output. Meat products, and 
in particular the fresh meat products, tend to exhibit increasing cost per unit marketing 
margins. Under these circumstances, marketing firms will not process products unless the 
price spread is sufficient to cover the cost of handling the final unit of product (Goodwin, 
1994).  
 
It is important to stress that marketing margins are not purely profit earned by wholesalers 
and retailers, but also take into account marketing costs, i.e. costs beyond farm-gate. 
Mark-up is closely related to price transmission, which I have previously discussed, and 
the fact that margins can vary imperfectly at the different market levels is often caused by 
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asymmetry. Relative changes in marketing margins are not solely caused by the profit 
maximization incentive of middlemen. The cost of transportation is an important 
contributor to variations in marketing margins. In the case of this study, the product is 
being transported between each stage in the distribution chain; hence transportation costs 
are added all the way. Salmon going from Norway to France also face different 
currencies, and the bilateral exchange rate between the two countries is also likely to 
influence the margins. I will discuss this aspect more thoroughly in the next section of this 
chapter. The mathematical approach to a mark-up rule can be given by applying eq. (1) 
from this chapter.  
 
2.3 Exchange rates 
 
When a commodity is traded internationally currency exchange rates may be a 
considerable source of alteration of the market equilibrium. Depending on your point of 
view, a change in the currency exchange rate will influence either the demand curve or 
the supply curve. For the supplier, who sees the world through his own currency 
exchange rate, a change in the currency exchange rate will be manifested in a shift in the 
demand of the commodity supplied. Conversely, a change in the currency exchange rate 
for the demander will be manifested as a shift in the supply. Houck (1986) defines 
exchange rates among international currencies as the prices of one nation’s money in 
terms of other currencies. Thus, domestic conditions like prices, costs, inflation, and other 
values for goods and services are reflected onto the international scene.  
 
The impact of relative changes in the currency exchange rates will be one of the aspects 
scrutinized in this study. To understand the rudimentary dynamics of currency exchange 
rates I have adopted an approach on this topic based on Houck (1986). 
 
Consider two trading nations, A and B, with monetary separate units, called alphas 
( )α and betas ( )β  respectively. Let us now investigate how shifting currency exchange 
rates affect a partial equilibrium analysis in an imaginary international commodity market. 
Our focal point will be Nation A, with the currencyα , who is a net exporter of product q. 
Correspondingly; Nation B will be a net importer of product q.  
 26 
 
First, consider the demand curve (figure 6) and the following effect of devaluation, that is, 
a weakening relative to another currency so that one may buy fewer units of the other 
currency with the same nominal amount. A devaluation of α  from the supplier’s point of 
view will be followed by a shift in the demand curve from  to  as shown in figure 6. 
Consequently, a revaluation, which is a strengthening relative to another currency so that 
one may buy more units of the other currency with the same nominal amount, will be 


















Figure 6 – Demand curve adjustments 
The consequence of a devaluation of α  is in fact that more alphas can be purchased with 
the same nominal amount of betas. Hence, Nation B by using the same amount of β  can 
after the devaluation buy more units of product q as demand increases. Oppositely, when 
the α  revaluates fewer alphas can be purchased for a given amount of betas and the 
demand for q measured in alphas will decrease. Thus, we see that exchange rates 












Figure 7 – Supply curve adjustments 
Turning to the supply curve (figure 7) and the demander’s viewpoint, the effect when α  
devaluates is that the α  can be purchased for fewer units of the demander’s β . From 
equilibrium, , this shift is indicated in the figure as a rotation to . Contrarily, a 








According to Houck (1986) currency exchange rates adjustments can have real 
economical implications. For example, from 1996 the British pound revalued considerably 
relative to NOK, and the pound also revalued relative to EUR (i.e., NOK/GBP +25 % and 
NOK/EUR +20 %). For Scottish salmon exporters the consequences of this revaluation 
would be similar to that of an introduction of a 20 % export tariff on the salmon export to 
the European Union. Moreover, a depreciation of NOK or an appreciation of EUR could 
make the minimum price of the SA binding. Correspondingly, an appreciation of NOK or a 
depreciation of the EUR could nullify the effect of a minimum price. 
 
Thus, the impact of fluctuating exchange rates can have serious price effects in the 
international marketplace. Moreover, recent analyses suggest world salmon markets are 
highly integrated (Asche et al., 1999; Asche, 2001), which would support the assumption 
underlying the model that international price transmission (i.e., the exchange rate 
transmission elasticity) is incomplete.  
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With the foregoing in mind and remembering equation (1), which states that the price of a 
commodity in one geographical market is equal to the price in another geographical 
market and the cost of transportation. This equation must be extended to account for the 
influence of different currencies, and we get the following: 
 
(2)     ( )x d xdP P C Z= + dx  
Where  is the price given in xP β ,  the price given in dP α , dxZ is the currency exchange 
rate between α  and β , and C is the transportation costs expressed in xd α . Thus, 
equation 2 expresses the price in Nation X (the country exported to) given in the β  
currency. The bilateral currency exchange rate dxZ adjust the variables expressed in α  so 






In this chapter I will describe my data set and how I went forth to collect it. 
 
3.1 Collection  
In order to measure the price transmission on salmon, the exchange rate and 
transportation elasticities, I had to collect the data from several sources. Monthly time  
series data from January 1995 to December 2006 was used for econometric analyses. I 
have collected salmon farmer prices from Fiskerinæringens Landsforening (FNL), 
wholesale prices from Norwegian Seafood Export Council (NSEC), retail prices from 
Institut Nationale de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques – France (INSEE) (through 
Statistisk Sentralbyrå, SSB), exchange rates from 
http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/xr/data.html and transportation data was obtained from 
Transportøkonomisk Institutt (TØI) (again through SSB). 
 
The data on salmon farmer prices was provided by FNL. The data set gives information 
on the amount and price of slaughtered salmon, distributed on the various weight classes 
for any given week, measured in headed and gutted weight (product weight). Due to the 
unavailability of monthly data in the period from January to December 1995, I used 
weekly averages to obtain the monthly data. Also, given the fact that the data provided 
were divided into weight classes I used a weighted average to obtain one observation for 
a given week. In addition, for the earlier part of the set, 1995 more specifically, I had to 
punch data from a paper copy. 
 
As for the wholesale data set provided by NSEC, the processing went much smoother 
due to the well-known format in which it was presented. The data set supplies monthly 
prices on the Norwegian salmon exported to France (free on board, FOB) as they are 
reported to SSB. The wholesale prices used are for headed and gutted salmon. 
 
Many thanks to the Library at SSB where I got data on salmon retail prices sold in France 
collected by INSEE. The data set, “Indice des Prix a la Consommation”, is an index on 
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various salmon products sold at French hyper- and supermarkets. The French salmon 
data series was modified by splicing two price indexes6 
 
3.2 Description 
The success of any econometric analysis ultimately depends on the availability of the 
appropriate data. I will therefore spend some time discussing the nature of my data. 
Three types of data may be available for empirical analysis, time series, cross sectional 
and pooled (combination of time series and cross sectional) data. Table 1 shows 
summary statistics for the time series data used in my thesis. 
 
Table 1 – Summary statistics for variables used  
 
NAME  N MEAN  ST. DEV VARIANCE      MIN.   MAX.  
FNL   144 24.67  4.67    21.80     15.60 43.25 ( 1P )
)
)
EFF   144 27.34  3.80    14.43     19.35 41.14 ( )2P
IPC   144   7.75  0.69      0.47       6.55 10.25 ( 3,EURP
IPC   144 62.78  5.94    35.34     53.47 84.95  ( 3,NOKP
TRA   144   112.69          10.39  107.87     97.10 133.00 
NOK_EUR  144   8.10  0.29      0.09       7.29     8.94 
EUR_NOK  144   0.12  0.00      0.00       0.11     0.14 
              
Key: Transportation costs = TRA, Norwegian kroner NOK / EUR = NOK _EUR and 
EUR / NOK = EUR_NOK. For practical purposes the IPC ( )3,EURP was converted to yield 
IPC . I.e., all the variables are given in NOK.  ( 3,NOKP )
                                           
3.2.1 Type of data 
A time series is a set of observations on the values that a variable takes at different times. 
Such data may be collected at regular time intervals, such as daily (e.g., stock prices), 
 
6 See e.g. http://shazam.econ.ubc.ca/examples/splice.sha for more information on this procedure. 
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weekly (e.g., salmon prices provided by NSEC), monthly (e.g., unemployment rate, the 
Consumer Price Index), quarterly (e.g., GNP) or annually (e.g., government budgets).   
The data thus collected may be quantitative (e.g., income, prices, money, wages) or 
qualitative (e.g., male or female, college graduate or not). Qualitative variables, also 
called dummy variables or categorical variables, can be every bit as important as the 
quantitative variables (Gujarati, 1995). 
Although time series data are used in many econometric studies, they present some 
special problems for econometricians. Most empirical work based on time series data 
assumes that the underlying data is stationary. Loosely speaking a time series is 
stationary if its mean value and its variance do not vary systematically over time. Another 
problem frequently encountered in time series data is autocorrelation among the 
disturbances u entering into the population regression function. In the classical linear 
regression model (CLRM) no autocorrelation is one the underlying assumptions. Put 
simply, the CLRM assumes that the disturbance term relating to any other observation is 
not influenced by the disturbance term relating to any other observation (Gujarati, 1995, p. 
401). 
i
3.2.2 The sources of data 
The data used in empirical analysis may be collected by a government agency (e.g., the 
Department of Commerce), an international agency (e.g., the IMF or the OECD), a private 
organization (e.g., FNL), or an individual. The data collected by these agencies may be 
experimental or non-experimental in nature. In the social sciences the data that one 
generally obtains are non-experimental in nature, that is, not subject to the control of the 
researcher. Often, this lack of control often creates special problems for the researcher in 
pinning down the exact cause or causes affecting a particular situation. 
 
3.2.3 The accuracy of data 
Although plenty of data are available for econometric research, the quality of the data is 
often not that good. There are several reasons for that. First, as noted, most social 
science data are non-experimental in nature. Therefore, there is the possibility of 
observational errors, either of omission or commission. Second, even in experimentally 
collected data errors of measurement arise from approximations and round offs. Third, in 
questionnaire-type surveys, the problem of non-response can be serious. A researcher 
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can be lucky to get a 40 % response to a questionnaire. Analysis based on such partial 
response may not truly reflect the behaviour of the 60 % who did not respond, thereby 
leading to what is known as (sample) selectivity bias. Fourth, the sampling methods used 
in obtaining the data may vary so widely that is often difficult to compare the results 
obtained from the various samples. Fifth, economic data are generally available at a 
highly aggregate level. Such highly aggregated data may not tell us much about the 
individual or micro units that may be the ultimate object of the study. Sixth, because of 
confidentiality, certain data can be published only in highly aggregate form. The FNL, for 
example, is not allowed to disclose data from an individual county if there are three or less 
farmers reporting slaughtered volume of salmon. 
Because of these and many other problems, the researcher should always keep in mind 
that the results of research are only as good as the quality of the data. 
 
Finally, I conclude that my data set is a time series; it is of a quantitative nature; it is 
collected by various private, governmental and national agencies and it is of a non-
experimental nature. 
 
3.3 Norwegian salmon production 
 
The EU salmon market, and the French one in particular, is Norway’s most important 
market. France is followed by Denmark (although it is largely a transit country for 
Norwegian seafood on its way to the EU), Poland, Great Britain and Russia. Norwegian 
export of Atlantic salmon to the most important markets is shown in figure 8. On the global 
market Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) has traditionally obtained higher prices than the 
Pacific species (Onchorynchus spp., i.e., Sockeye, Coho, Chinook, Chum and Pink), even 
though the latter are available in larger quantities. In fact, in 1982, 80 % of the French 
import originated from the wild-caught Pacific species (Guillotreau et al., 2005). Sea-
raised rainbow trout is also considered as a substitute to salmon in some markets, Japan 
in particular. In 1997 the production of farmed salmon worldwide exceeded the catch of 
wild salmon. The scenario remains the same today; the increase in the global salmon 
output is provided by farmed salmon. Norwegian production of Atlantic salmon has risen 
from 74 879 tons round weight in 1988 to 572 000 tons in 2006, as can be seen in figure 
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9. In 2006 Norwegian salmon revenues surpassed 17 billion NOK, which is a new record 


































































Figure 8 – Norwegian export of Atlantic salmon – by market 







































































Figure 9 – Norwegian export of Atlantic salmon 1988-2006 
(Source: NSEC and SSB)  
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On the international scene Norway produced 572 000 tons of Atlantic salmon in 2005, 
which is 46 % of the world production of 1.2 billion. Norway was followed by Chile (31 %), 
Great Britain (10 %) and North America (9 %). The most important Atlantic salmon 
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3.4 The French market 
 
In the French market for Atlantic salmon Norway is the market leader with 55 %. Fresh 
salmon is the most eaten fish product in France both in value and volume. Norway’s 
market share for fresh salmon is 68 %. Approximately half of the French salmon 
consumption is smoked salmon; the other half is fresh salmon. Norwegian export to 
France was ~89000 tons round weight in 2005, and Norway is one of few European 
suppliers who are able to deliver fresh salmon in large quantities. Hyper- and 
supermarkets in France controls 84 % of the turnover of fresh salmon, and 94 % of the 
smoked salmon turnover (Markedsplan Laks og Ørret 2007-2009, 2007). 
 
Figure 11 shows Norway’s export of fresh salmon to France from January 1995 to 
December 2006. There clearly is a trend throughout the period in which the volume sold 
increases in the months September to December. The volume usually culminates in 
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December, which of course corresponds with Christmas. Empirically, the lowest 
observation for volume is   1 780 tons in January 1996, while the highest observation is   
9 177 tons in December 2006. As for the wholesale price, the lowest one obtained was 
19.35 NOK/kg in July 2003, while the highest price obtained for the period was 41.14 
NOK/kg in June 2006. Clearly, for the duration of the period from 1995 to 2006, the 
substantial increase in salmon prices that started in late 2005, culminated in a series of 
record high prices in 2006. The trend with soaring prices coincides with the world salmon 
prices. The average salmon price in 2005 was 26,58 NOK/kg and 31,86 NOK/kg in 2006. 
NSEC points out that the global increase in salmon prices is caused by an increase in the 













































































































Volume (t) Price (NOK/kg) 
Figure 11 – Norwegian exports of fresh salmon to France 1995-2006 





3.5 Historical review of prices and margins 
 
Retail prices of salmon did fall from 1995 to mid-1997, after which they have been 
relatively constant around 63 NOK/kg on a live weight basis. The wholesale and slaughter 
prices however, have been relatively constant, around 27 NOK/kg and 25 NOK/kg 



















































Figure 12 – Salmon prices at slaughter, wholesale and retail levels 1995-2006 
(Source: INSEE, NSEC and FNL) 
 
To help identify the source of the increase in this margin over time, the slaughter-to-retail 
price margin can be decomposed into the slaughter-to-wholesale margin and the 
wholesale-to-retail margin. Compared to the wholesale-to-retail spread, the slaughter-to-
wholesale spread for salmon has been relatively constant throughout the period from 
1995 to 2006. There was a high of 9.4 NOK/kg in early 2002 and a low of – 2.28 NOK/kg 
in the spring of 2006. However, at the end the period the spread recovered to nearly 3 
                                            
7 Exact mean values are slaughter (FNL) = 24.67, wholesale (EFF) = 27.40 and retail (IPC) = 62.78 with 144 
observations. 
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NOK/kg (Figure 13). Over the same 1995-2006 period, the wholesale-to-retail price 
margin for salmon has decreased markedly, from a high of about 50.5 NOK/kg in 




































Figure 13 – Salmon marketing margins 1995-2006 
(Source: INSEE, NSEC and FNL) 
 
On the basis of the slaughter-to-wholesale and the wholesale-to-retail margins, the 
retailer and wholesaler segments receive the lion’s share of the salmon krone as 
exhibited in figure 14. The figure is based on annual mean values, in contrast to the 
monthly data shown in figures 11 through 13. Sector shares were found by using the 
slaughter price, slaughter-to-wholesale and wholesale-to-retail margins relative to the 
retail price in France. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                

















Figure 14 – Sector shares of the retail salmon krone 
(Source: INSEE, NSEC and FNL) 
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4 Methodology and Procedure 
 
In this chapter I will describe the procedure on structural models for price transmission 
and the model for testing for asymmetric price transmission. I will also specify the four 
operational functions used, and finally a note on the interpretation of the results is 
included.  
 
4.1 A brief historical review 
Before proceeding with the procedure behind the applied models, I will present a brief 
review of the development of the estimation of asymmetric price adjustments. Farrel 
(1952) investigated irreversibility empirically, the scope of his analysis was irreversible 
demand functions. In agricultural economics the price transmission process was 
scrutinized by Tweeten and Quance (1969) by adapting a dummy variable approach to 
estimate irreversible supply functions. Wolffram (1971) criticized this model, and instead 
introduced a variable splitting approach involving first differences in the estimated 
equation.  Wolffram’s model was improved by Gollnick (1972), which according to Meyer 
and von Cramon-Taubadel (2002a), simplified the test for asymmetric price transmission. 
In 1977 Houck presented a model based on and further developed from the framework of 
Wolffram, but which in essence was more operationally clearer. Ward (1982) elaborated 
Houck’s model to include lags of exogenous variables, and over the last two decades 
Ward’s approach has by far been the basis of most of the work in the price transmission 
field. Of late however, various other models for testing for asymmetry have gained 
support and claimed to be more appropriate under certain circumstances. Specifically, 
Von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy (1999) presented an asymmetric error correction model 
based on Granger and Lee (1989). The model can be used to test for asymmetric price 
transmissions and is more appropriate if the data in question contains a unit root. Finally, 
Abdulai and Rieder (1999), and Goodwin and Harper (2000) both used a threshold 





4.2 Procedure on the structural model 
A mathematical approach to the formulation of a model, which describes how the price in 
one price level of the value chain is affected by the price in another price level, can be 
written as . The empirical data I have collected for this model is the salmon 
farmer level price, the export level price to France and the consumption level price at 
supermarkets in France. I also have time series data on currency exchange rates and on 
transportation costs. Because the price series data presented in this thesis are functions 
of the same basic information, the series must be related. For simplicity, imagine a 








(3)     ( )x dP f p=  
 
However, the consumption level price in France, , is a gross price that includes 
transportation, tariffs and other international marketing costs (Kinnucan and Myrland, 
2001). In this study I have included the relative impact on  by some other factors: The 
cost of transportation, the bilateral currency exchange rate (EUR/NOK and NOK/EUR) 
and a dummy variable correcting for the Salmon Agreement. Thus the conceptual 




time, price at other level in the value chain, currency exchange rate, 
P f






Following the model proposed by Kinnucan and Myrland (2001) and by Paudel (2002), I 
posit a simple mark-up rule as follows: 
 
(4)     ( )x d dP p c= + Z  
 
Where x indexes the export market;  is the foreign market price for salmon expressed in 
the foreign currency (EUR);  is the domestic price of salmon expressed in domestic 





( = EUR/NOK) is the bilateral exchange rate. 9Taking the total differential of equation (4) 
yields: 
 
(5)     x x d dd  P Z d  p p d  Z d  C= + + d
Z
 
Where  is the cost of transportation expressed in foreign currency (EUR). 
Dividing the above equation through by , and noting that 
d dC c Z=
xP x xP p=  where dp  is the 
domestic currency (NOK), yields: 
 




which may be simplified to yield: 
 
(7)    0 1 2* * *x dP p  Z  Cβ β β= + +    
 
where asterisked variables indicate relative changes, so that * /d dP d  P Pd= , and 
0 1 1.β β= <  Which means the mark-up model in equation (4) implies that the price 
transmission and currency exchange rate-elasticities are equal and less than one. 
However, there is also a restriction on the transportation cost-elasticity, 2.β  More 
specifically, from equation (4) we have: 
 




which implies that d xc p p= − . Thus, from equation (6) it follows immediately that 
(2 1 )0β β= − , i.e. the transportation cost-elasticity equals one minus the price transmission 
cost elasticity, or simply that 0 2 1β β+ = . The restriction could be tested in the estimated 
models; however such tests are outside the scope of this thesis and will therefore not be 
investigated.  
 
                                            
9 Prices and currency exchange rates are expressed in nominal terms. Thus, I implicitly assume that 
inflation rates the two countries in question are approximately the same.  
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Thus, the specified empirical model yields: 
 
(8)   , 0 1 , 2 3 , 4x t d t t d t t x tP p Z C SA ,uβ β β β β= + + + + +  
 
Where  indexes the observationt ( )2,3,...,144 for January 1995 through December 2006t = ; 
SA is a dummy variable (SA= 0 in the period running from July 1997 to May 2003, and 1 
otherwise) to indicate the effect of the export tax specified in the Salmon Agreement on 
export prices to the EU; and u  is a stochastic disturbance term, which may well 
represent all those factors that affect the foreign market price for salmon but are not taken 
into account explicitly (Gujarati, 1995, p. 5). 
,x t
By incorporating the SA in the model we can test whether the agreement influenced the 
market mechanisms. The null-hypothesis is that the export tax and the minimum price 
restrictions implemented by the SA had an impact on the price mechanism. 
 
4.3 Procedure on the asymmetric model 
 
The next step in this study will be to investigate the existence of asymmetry in the value 
chain of Norwegian salmon exported to France. To check whether there exists asymmetry 
in the price mechanism, I will apply a model developed by Houck (1977). Houck’s basis 
was the model developed by Wolffram (1971), which dealt with nonreversibilities through 
segmenting the variables. By simplifying the specification of linear nonreversibilities 
Houck’s approach is de facto operationally easier to run. 
 
In the model he imagined that the variable Y depends upon the values taken by X and 
that both are time-series variables. The hypothesis he examined is that a one-unit 
increase in X from period to period have a different absolute impact on Y than do a one-
unit decrease in X .  
The relationship can be written as: 
 
(9)    0 1 2
POS NEG
i iY Xα α α∆ = + ∆ + ∆ iX






for i t where 1,2,...,= i i iY Y Y-1∆ = − ; 
POS
i i i tX X X −∆ = −  if i i tX X −>  and  otherwise; 0=
NEG
i i i tX X∆ = X −−  if i i tX X −<  and 0= otherwise; 0X is the initial value of ;X and is the 
initial value of Y  
0Y
. 0α  might be zero, positive or negative. A nonreversibility occurs in Y∆ if 
1 2.α α≠  To link equation (9) to the initial position, note that the value of Y at any point t  is: 
 







= + ∆∑  
 
for i t where T is the total number of observations beyond the initial 
value. The difference between the current and the initial value of is the sum of the 
period-to-period changes that have occurred, so that: 
1,2,..., , 1,..., ,t= + T
Y
 







− = ∆∑  
 
by inserting equation (9) into equation (11) and simplifying, gives: 
 
(12)    ( ) ( )0 0 1 2POS NEGt it X Xα α α− = + ∆ + ∆ iY Y ∑ ∑  
 
Letting *, POSt tY R  and  equal 
NEG
tD 0 ,tY Y−
POS
iX∆∑ , and NEGiX∆∑ , respectively, 
 
(13)     Y t  0 1 2
* POS




where POStR  is the sum of all period-to-period increases in X from its initial value up to 
period t , and  is the similar sum of all period-to-period decreases inNEGtD X . The variable 
POSR  is always positive, and  is always negative. If NEGD 0α  is not zero, it appears in 
equation (13) as a trend coefficient. In the case where a consumption level price response 
to changes in the export level price is equal (or symmetric) for both price decreases and 





:                                (symmetric price transmission)









Thus, if 1α  differ significantly from 2α  there is evidence of asymmetric price transmission. 
 
4.4 Procedure on the operational models 
 
Equation (8) is the general model in this study, but it will to some degree differ depending 
on which estimations I run. A brief description of the various specified operational models 
is described in the following. For simplification purposes the specified models will employ 
simpler and more specific variable names than the one outlined in the specified empirical 
model. Thus, table 2 is an overview of all variables used in the analyses, along with a 
brief definition. 
 
Table 2 – Overview of data and variable values 
Variable   Definition            Value / Mean 
FNL = 1P  
EFF =  2P
IPC =  3P
1,tP    Farm level price at time t (NOK)     24.67 
1,t-1P    Farm level price lagged one period 
2,tP    Export level price to France at time t (NOK)   27.34 
2,t-1P    Export level price to France lagged one period      
3,tP    Consumption level price in France at time t (EUR)    7.75 
tC    Cost of transportation at time t (NOK)              112.69 
ZNOK/EUR, t  Currency exchange rate at time t (NOK/EUR)      8.10 
ZEUR/NOK, t  Currency exchange rate at time t (EUR/NOK)      0.12 
DSA   Dummy variable correcting for Salmon Agreement 
Note*: SA from observation 31 to 101 (that is from July 1997 to May 2003). SA = 0 in the 




The first estimation I will run measures the price transmission between the price at the 
salmon farm level and the price at the export level to France. This estimation does not 
involve any currency exchange rate variable as both prices are given in NOK.  
Thus, the following equation will be used: 
 
(14)   2, 0 1 1, 2 1, 1 3 1, 4    t t t t tP P P P SA SA u t tβ β β β β−= + + + + +  
 
where  is the export level price of salmon to France at time t ,  is the Norwegian 
farm level price,  is the Norwegian farm level price lagged one period (month),  
is a dummy variable that measures the effect of the Salmon Agreement between Norway 






My second estimation measures the price transmission between the export level price to 
France and the consumption level price at supermarkets in France. This equation also 
incorporates variables for cost of transportation and currency exchange rate. 
My next estimation is as follows: 
 
(15) 3, 0 1 2, 2 2, 1 3 2, 2 4 2, 3 5 2, 6 2, 1
7 2, 2 8 2, 3 9 10 / , 11 / , 12 13
t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t EUR NOK t EUR NOK t t t t t t
P P P P P P SA P SA
P SA P SA SA Z Z SA C C SA u
β β β β β β β
β β β β β β β
− − − −
− −
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
 
 
where  is the consumption level price in France given in NOK at time ,  is the 
current export level price of salmon to France given in NOK, 
3,tP t 2,tP
2,t nP −  is the export level price 
of salmon to France lagged n periods (month),  measures the effect of the Salmon 
Agreement between Norway and the EU,  is the same variable lagged n periods, 






tC Z  is the bilateral currency exchange rate. 
Both the latter variables are also estimated during the duration of the SA. The conversion 
of all variables to Norwegian Kroner is not in accordance with the theoretical specification 
of the model, but nonetheless conducted for practical purposes. 
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As for the practical application of Houck’s model in this study, I will use equation (13) in 
my third estimation, testing for asymmetric price transmission. Thus, the specified model 
for estimating how a price change at one level of the farm-retail chain is  affected by 
positive or negative changes in the price at another level yields: 
 
(16)   0 1 2 3 4 5
POS POS NEG NEG
2,t 1,t 1,t t 1,t 1,t t t tP P P SA P P SA Sα α α α α α∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + +A u
 
Where POSP∆ and  indicates positive and negative price changes respectively. My 
null-hypothesis is that there is symmetric price transmission, and the alternative 
hypothesis that there is asymmetric price transmission.  
NEGP∆
 
The last estimation is based on a combination of equations (15) and (16), and a test of 
asymmetric price transmission in the export – retail linkage is conducted. This equation 
also incorporates variables for the SA, cost of transportation and currency exchange rate. 
Thus, the last estimation is as follows: 
 
(17)   0 1 2 3 4 5
6 / , 7 / , 8 9
POS POS NEG NEG
3,t 2,t 2,t t 2,t 2,t t t
EUR NOK t EUR NOK t t t t t t
P P P SA P P SA
Z Z SA C C SA u
α α α α α α
α α α α
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + +
+ + + +
SA
 
4.5 Interpretation of results 
 
Prior to running the estimations a few words on interpretation of the results is appropriate. 
Price transmission elasticities will be measured in the model, and will indicate how 
strongly shifts in the price influence the development of the price throughout the farm-
retail value chain. I will also investigate to what extent the cost of transportation and 
exchange rate influence the price mechanism. 
 
The results of the various tests I run in this study are presented in chapter 5. A test is a 
decision rule that tells us when to reject  and when not to reject ; tests are also 
specified by a test statistic and a rejection region. The maximum Type I error probability of 
a test is called its level of significance and is denoted by
0H 0H
α . The significance probability or 
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P-value of an observed test statistic is the smallestα for which this observation leads to a 
rejection of  (Johnson and Bhattacharyya, 1996). 0H
 
Consideration of the goodness of fit of the fitted regression line to a set of data is 
important when attempting to find out how well the sample regression line fits the data.  
Generally there will be some positive and some negativeu , and we hope  that these 
residuals around the regression line are as small as possible. The coefficient of 
determination r
ˆiu ˆi
2 (two-variable case) or R2 (multiple regression) is a summary measure 
that tells how well the sample regression line fits the data. Verbally, R2 measures the 
proportion or percentage of the total variation in Y explained by the regression model. The 
value of R2 lies between 0 and1, and the latter means a perfect fit, that is Y  for each i 
(Gujarati, 1995). I will be using the R
î Y= i
4
2 in this thesis. 
 
The most applied test for detecting serial correlation is that developed by statisticians 
Durbin and Watson. It is popularly known as the Durbin-Watson d statistic, and it is simply 
the ratio of the sum of squared differences in successive residuals to the RSS (Residual 
Sum of Squares). The bounds of d are 0 d≤ ≤ , any estimated d value must lie within 
these limits. If there is no serial correlation (of the first order), d is expected to be about 2. 
Therefore, as a rule of thumb, if d is found to be 2 in an application, one may assume that 
there is no first-order autocorrelation, either positive or negative. If there exists perfect 
positive correlation in the residuals, then d = 0, thus the closer d is to 0, the greater the 
evidence of positive serial correlation. Correspondingly, if there is perfect negative 
correlation among successive residuals, then d = 4. Hence, the closer d is to 4, the 
greater the evidence of negative serial correlation. 
 
An assumption underlying this study is that of Leontief market technology, that is, capital 
and labour must be used in a fixed proportion. This implies that there is a production 
function in which no substitution between inputs is possible. Applied to the case of salmon 
exports this means the same processing technology and the same proportions of input 







5.1 Price transmission between the farm level and the export level 
 
The first model I ran examined the relationship between the price at the export level 
(EFF),  and at the farm level (FNL), . The estimated model I used is found in equation 
(14), and the price transmission elasticities are presented in table 3 
2P 1P
 
Table 3 – Price transmission elasticities between the farm level and the export level 
 
Variable    Elasticity      P-value 
1,tP       0.6185      0.000   
1,t-1P       0.1030        0.003                       
1,t *P SA                        - 0.0986         0.000                       
SA       0.1190        0.000                       
 Durbin-Watson d    1.7681 
2R       0.9623          
               
 
The Durbin-Watson d is 1.7681, with n = 143 and k’ = 4. This value is within the 0.05 level 
of significance with critical values = 1.679 and = 1.788, hence there is inconclusive 
evidence regarding the presence or absence of positive first-order serial correlation. The 
Ld Ud
2R of 0.9642 indicates how much of the total variation in the dependent variable, , is 
explained by the explanatory variables. In this case, more than 96 % of the data fits the 
sample regression line.  
2P
 
By studying table 3 one finds that the price transmission elasticity from the farm level 
(FNL) to the export level (EFF) is 0.7215. Stated more simply, a one percent change in 
the farm level price will cause the export level price to increase by less than one percent 
(i.e., 0.72), and the transmission of price is incomplete. Both the lagged value of the farm 
level price and the farm level price elasticities, 0.1030 and 0.6185 respectively, are 
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statistically significant within a 99 % level. Thus, both farm level prices is important in the 
determination of prices in the lower level of the supply chain. The current farm level price 
has a stronger impact on the export level price than the past price at the farm level  
 
Furthermore, an elasticity of - 0.0986 indicates that the effect of the SA reduces the 
export level price somewhat, and this statistic is significant. The hypothesis is that the 
initiation of the SA did influence the price mechanism. Even though the Salmon 
Agreement reduced the price transmission from 0.7215 to 0.6229 as a short-run 
adjustment, the influence of the SA at this level in the value chain is not very strong.  
 
5.2 Price transmission between the export level and the retail level 
 
The next estimation measures the relationship between the export level price and the 
consumer level price. This model also includes variables for transportation costs and the 
currency exchange rate (EUR/NOK). Function (15) was used. The price transmission 
elasticities are shown in table 4. 
 
The Durbin-Watson d of 2.0100 indicates that the d-value is greater than = 1.924, and 
there is no evidence of positive first-order autocorrelation. The goodness of fit 
coefficient,
Ud
2R is 0.8788, and the model has a very good explanation of the variables. 
 
In the overall picture the price transmission elasticity between the consumer level and the 
export level is 0.5473. In other words, about 55 % of the changes in the export level are 
transferred to the retail level. Three out of four elasticities are significant within a 5 % 
level, ranging from 0.18 to 0.21. The overall elasticity is weaker than the corresponding 
elasticity from equation (14), but is consistent with the findings of Kinnucan and Myrland 
(2001). The reason why it differs from equation (14) may be that there are more variables 
involved in this model than in the former. This model also includes the exogenous 
variables transportation costs and currency exchange rates. Clearly, the price mechanism 
is weakened as the salmon moves up the value chain, and the market mechanism seems 
to be more efficient in the farm-export linkage. This suggests that the market is more 
integrated at the lower level of the value chain than in the upper level.  
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The impact of the Salmon Agreement on the export level price yields an elasticity of  
- 0.1287, which means that under the influence of the SA the price transmission elasticity 
is reduced from 0.5473 to 0.4186. Two out of four elasticities are significant within a 5 % 
level, ranging from - 0.03 to - 0.08 By way of comparison, the relative difference is 
approximately the same as the one observed in the farm-export linkage in equation (14). 
The reduction is not very strong, but the relatively inelastic pattern from the farm-export 
linkage is repeated and the SA weakens the price transmission elasticity. 
 
Table 4 – Price transmission elasticities between the export level and the retail level 
 
Variable    Elasticity     P-value   
2,tP       0.1783     0.010   
2,t-1P       0.1836          0.045    
2,t-2P           -0.0206     0.819                  
2,t-3P       0.2060     0.002  





    -0.0803      0.041               
2,t-1 *P S     -0.0264     0.109              
2,t-2 *P S            0.0101     0.539                  
2,t-3 *P S     -0.0321     0.021  
*∑ 2,tP SA     -0.1287   
SA      -0.2178     0.163              
EUR/NOK, tZ      -1.6477      0.000                
EUR/NOK, tZ *SA      0.4422      0.016   
tC        0.3735      0.000  
*tC SA      -0.1358      0.044              
Durbin-Watson d    2.0100 
2R       0.8788           




The currency exchange rate between EUR and NOK has a significant effect on the price 
at the retail price level in France within the limit of 0.01. The estimated coefficient is 
 -1.6477, and it is by far the most influential regressor in this estimation. For the 
Norwegian exporter this implies a strengthened Krone and an inward shift of his excess 
demand curve. For the French importer revaluation of the NOK has the reverse effect, 
shifting the excess supply curve outward. Thus, the Norwegian exporter’s production 
surplus is reduced with a strengthened Krone. The result is not coherent with the findings 
of Kinnucan and Myrland (2001). However, during the SA the currency exchange rate 
elasticity is 0.4422, and it is significant within the 0.05 limit. This suggests that the 
currency exchange rate elasticity weakened the Krone during the SA. At any rate results 
show that both elasticities strongly influence the price mechanism at this level of the value 
chain, even though the elasticity outside the SA is quite predominant. 
 
The cost of transportation also shows significant results within the 1 % level. The effect of 
changes in the transportation cost gives an elasticity of 0.3735. This indicates that the 
transportation cost does affect the price at the retail level of the Norway-France value 
chain. The estimated coefficient is consistent with that of Kinnucan and Myrland (2001), 
only slightly lower. Furthermore it seems like the two salmon markets are well integrated 
and that the market mechanism is efficient with respect to transportation costs. Also, 
bearing in mind the results from the impact of the currency exchange rates, both 
exogenous variables have a strong effect of the retail price in France. Nevertheless, 
during the SA the cost of transportation elasticity is -0.1358, also a significant result within 
the 5 % level. The result indicates that during the SA, when transportation costs 










5.3 Summary of price transmission results 
 
A brief summary of the results from chapter 5.1 and 5.2 on the price transmission 
analyses follows: 
 
 Even though I have only conducted two price transmission analyses, a general 
trend seems to have emerged. As the salmon moves up the value chain the 
estimated price transmission coefficients are weakened. The farm – export linkage 
is better integrated, and the price is more fully passed through at this level of the 
value chain than at the export – retail level. 
 
 The influence of the SA has a significant impact on the price transmission 
elasticities. Although the estimated coefficients are inelastic, they all point in the 
same direction. The transmission is markedly reduced during the period in which 
the SA regulated the market. There was significant evidence of this both in the 
farm – export linkage and in the export-retail linkage. Thus, the SA weakened the 
market mechanism and obscured the price signals. 
 
 Transportation costs do affect the price transmission elasticities estimated. There 
is evidence to support the claim that when the transportation costs are increased 
the price transmission also increases. This was the case outside the SA period of 
influence. During the SA, transportation cost also had a significant effect on the 
export – retail price transmission. When the transportation costs increase the price 
transmission elasticity is reduced to some extent. 
 
 The currency exchange rate between EUR and NOK is affecting the price 
transmission between the export price level and the consumer level, i.e., at the 
retail level. The revaluation of the Norwegian Krone is a very important contributor 
in the price transmission at this level of the supply chain. However, during the 
influence of the SA the currency exchange rate elasticity is also significant, but in 




5.4 Test of asymmetric price transmission in the farm – export linkage 
 
In this chapter I will investigate whether there exists asymmetry, or imperfect price 
transmission in the time series. The tests were conducted following the approach adopted 
by Houck (1977), and explained in chapter 4.3. To sum up, a test is done to establish if an 
increase in the price has the same price transmission elasticity as a decrease in the price. 
Thus, I will be able to measure how a price change at one level in the value chain is 
affected by either positive or negative changes in the price at another level. Function (16) 
was used, and the price transmission elasticities are outlined in table 5.  
 
Table 5 – Price transmission elasticities in the farm - export linkage 
 
Variable    Elasticity       P-value 
POS
1,tP                 0.6640        0.000  
1,
NEG





          -0.3877         0.012  
1, *
NEG
tP       -0.2712        0.043      
tSA        -1.1428        0.776 
Durbin-Watson d        1.9292 
2R         0.6812     
              
The Durbin-Watson d of 1.9292 indicates that the d-value is greater than = 1.802, and 
there is no evidence of positive first-order autocorrelation, thus we cannot reject the null-
hypothesis. The coefficient of determination 
Ud
2R of 0.6812 tells me that 68 % of the 
variation is explained by the sample regression line. 
 
From table 5 it is clear that there is significant evidence of asymmetry in the price 
transmission relationship between the export level and the farm level. The price at the 
export level responds more to a relative reduction in the farm level price than to a relative 





From July 1997 to May 2003 the Salmon Agreement was in effect, and the price 
transmission elasticity between the export level and the farm level yielded the following 
results: For an increase in the price the elasticity is -0.3877 and the elasticity for a 
decrease is -0.2712. Both values are significant within a 5 % level of confidence, and the 
price transmissions are reduced throughout the duration of the SA. This is consistent with 
the findings from the other models, thus far. Even though the export price responds more 
to an increase in the farm level price than to a decrease, there is evidence of asymmetry 
in the price transmission.  
 
Table 6 – Statistical inference – testing two hypotheses of asymmetry 
 
Test             Hypothesis                  P-value                    Decision 
POS















                 0.3496                         Reject         0H
                                                                                                                                  















       0.1945                         Reject  0H






                                  
 
To establish whether there exists evidence of asymmetric price transmission in the time 
series two tests were conducted. In the first test the positive changes in the farm level 
price minus the negative changes in the farm level price were to equal zero. We know that 
if the price transmission elasticity for a positive change is significantly different from the 
elasticity for a negative change, there is evidence of asymmetric price transmission. It 
follows then that POS1,tP -  must equal zero if there is to exist symmetric price 
transmission. The test conducted shows a p = 0.3496 (in table 6), and thus, the decision 
rule is to reject the null-hypothesis at the 10 % level and we can conclude that the 
alternative hypothesis is true, i.e., there is evidence of asymmetric price transmission. 
From table 5 it is clear that the price changes at the export level respond more to a 






The first test was conducted independent of the Salmon Agreement. The next asymmetry 
test is done by also including the effect of the SA on the price changes; otherwise the test 
is the same as above. The test shows a p = 0.1945, which is consistent with the first test. 
Thus, we reject the null-hypothesis, and conclude that there is evidence of asymmetric 
price transmission for the duration of the SA.                         
 
 
5.5 Test of asymmetric price transmission in the export – retail linkage 
 
In the last estimation the relationship between the retail level and the farm level price is 
measured and tested for asymmetry. Variables for cost of transportation and currency 
exchange rates are also included in this model. For this purpose function (17) was used, 
and the price transmission elasticities are presented in table 7. 
 
Table 7 – Price transmission elasticities in the farm – retail linkage 
 
Variable    Elasticity                 P-value 
2,t




                 - 0.0430                  0.943      
2,t
NEGP                0.0631                   0.803       
2,t *
NEGP          0.2725           0.576        
SA         - 4.8846           0.667  
EUR/NOK, tZ       - 41.0830          0.605                
EUR/NOK, tZ *SA                  75.0750           0.498             
tC                      0.2039          0.146             
*tC SA          -0.2971         0.426 
Durbin-Watson d           2.0846 




From table 7 we find the Durbin-Watson d-value of 2.0846, and like the result from 
equation (16), this d-value is also greater than = 1.862. Thus, there is no evidence of 
positive first-order autocorrelation, and the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected. The 
Ud
2R of 




Only the positive changes of the price at the export level have significant values in this 
model (the elasticity is 0.6940). Thus we cannot with statistical certainty establish whether 
there exists asymmetry at this level of the value chain. However, the relatively low 
coefficient of determination for this model suggests that the relative explanatory 
contribution is weak. Thus, for this specific regression the applied exogenous variables 
shed little light on the total variation in the retail price. 
 
 To sum up the results from the tests of asymmetry I have established with 
statistical certainty that there is asymmetric price transmission in the farm – retail 
linkage. Furthermore, it is clear that the price changes at the export level respond 
more to a decrease in the farm level price than to an increase. During the SA the 
elasticities were weakened, which concurs with the results from the other 
estimations. Moreover, the export price responds more to an increase in the farm 
level price than to a decrease in this period. 
 
 Two tests were conducted to establish whether there exists evidence of 
asymmetric price transmission in the time series. The test without the influence of 
the SA and the test with the influence of the SA both produced evidence that 
support asymmetry. 
 
 Unfortunately, poor results from my last estimation made it impossible to measure 










6 Summary and concluding remarks 
 
The scope of this thesis was to examine the value chain for Norwegian salmon exports to 
France. The objective of the analysis was to investigate the price mechanism along the 
retail, wholesale and farmer levels of the Norwegian - French salmon marketing chain. I 
also outlined some key questions that I wanted to explore, including other factors that 
might influence the price mechanism. In agricultural economics price transmission 
elasticities are frequently applied to investigate various markets, but studies on the 
salmon markets are scarce. Due to relatively easy access to some of the data I have 
processed, and the fact that France is such a principal and large importer of salmon on 
the global scene, made France a natural debarkation point for my journey.  
 
The thesis and the analyses I have run have exhibited price transmission between the 
farm level and the export level to be quite high. By moving up the salmon marketing chain 
this linkage is weakened. The price transmission elasticity is more inelastic at this level, 
and it seems like the price is transmitted faster at the lower level of the value chain than in 
the upper level.  
 
An interesting finding in this study is the relative importance of the SA on the price 
mechanism during the period in which it regulated the salmon market. In the farm - export 
linkage the relationship was inelastic, but there was evidence of influence on the price 
transmission elasticity. This is also the case in the export – retail linkage, with the same 
inelastic, but still significant influence on the price transmission. The transmission is 
reduced during the period of the SA’s influence. Thus, the SA weakened the market 
mechanism and obscured the price signals. 
 
The cost of transportation also has an effect on the price transmission elasticity on the 
retail level. The costs had a significant impact on the retail price outside the SA, and when 
the transportation costs are increased the price transmission also increases. During the 
SA, when transportation costs increased the price transmission elasticity, to some extent, 
is reduced.  
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Perhaps the most powerful influence by any one variable was that of the currency 
exchange rate between EUR and NOK. It influenced the price transmission between the 
export price level and the retail level. The revaluation of the Norwegian Krone is a very 
important contributor in the price transmission at this level of the supply chain. However, 
during the influence of the SA the currency exchange rate elasticity is also significant, but 
in this period the Krone was weakened and the price transmission was increased.  
 
Understanding and to some degree being able to forecast salmon price is becoming more 
and more important, because with certainty we know that the salmon prices will continue 
to exhibit large fluctuations. The salmon company boom in the stock markets and the 
interest around the week-to-week price changes supports this fact. 
 
There are several interesting results of this thesis, the strong link between the farm level 
and the export level price compared to that between the export level and the retail level. 
Clearly the latter is quite inelastic compared to the former, and this result tells us that 
retail prices in France do not transmit price changes so quickly or as massively as we 
might experience in Norway. Then again, this is as expected. Higher up in the value chain 
there is a higher degree of packaging, processing, pricing and distribution, and this is not 
the case at the lower levels in the value chain. Also, both the currency exchange rate and 
transportation costs have significant impact on the price transmission.  
 
Still little research is done concerning salmon markets and the economical impacts for the 
salmon industry. With its leading role in the global salmon market it is very important for 
Norway to have reliable market information systems and to understand the dynamics of 
the international market. Because of the frequent changes in the global price mechanism 
this task must have the highest priority at the desks of policy-makers. 
 
Unfortunately, there are limitations on the availability of data for this kind of an analysis. 
There are many middlemen in the value chain I have tried to describe, and to get the 
broader picture data should have been obtained from more of these intermediaries. Exact 
registration and tracking systems, which may very well be introduced in the nearest 
future, will enhance the data collecting process. 
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7 References - internet 
 
http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/data.html    Pacific exchange rate service 
  
http://www.nordea.no     Nordea’s exchange rates 
 
http://www.fiskeoppdrett.no   FHL Aquaculture 
 
http://www.godfisk.no/    Norwegian Seafood Export Council  
 
http://www.insee.fr Institut Nationale de la Statistique et des 
Etudes Economiques – France  
 
http://www.jochenmeyer.de/paper.htm  Some of the papers I downloaded in .pdf 
 
http://www.tutor2u.net    Online Learning Resource of the Year 
 
http://www.intrafish.com    IntraFish Media; news and analyses  
 
 
http://www.ssb.no     Statistics Norway 
 
http://shazam.econ.ubc.ca/   Shazam Econometrics Homepage 
 
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu Agricultural and applied economics 
scholarly literature 
 
http://www.jstor.org/     Journal storage online. 
 
http://www.toi.no     Norwegian Centre of Transport research 
 
 




8 References  
 
Tall og fakta 2006. Norwegian Seafood Export Council (2006) 
  
Markedsplan Laks og Ørret 2007-2009. Norwegian Seafood Export Council (2007) 
  
Norsk eksport av laks og ørret 2006. Norwegian Seafood Export Council (2007) 
  
Abdulai, A. and P. Rieder (1999) Using Threshold Cointegration to Estimate Asymmetric 
Price Transmission in the Swiss Pork Market. ETH, Zürich. 
  
Asche, F. (2001). "Testing the effect of an Anti-Dumping Duty: The US Salmon Market." 
Marine Resource Economics 16: 235-247. 
  
Asche, F., et al. (1999). "Product Aggregation, Market Integration, and Relationships 
between Prices: An application to world salmon Markets." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 81: 568-581. 
  
Asche, F., et al. (2002). Vertical Relationships in the Value Chain: An Analysis Based on 
Price Information for Cod and Salmon in Europe. Centre of Fisheries Economics Report. 
76. 
  
Asche, F., et al. (1998). "Økonomiske betraktninger rundt lakseavtalen med EU." Rapport 
til Eksportutvalget for fisk, not published. 
  
Asche, F. and T. Sebulonsen (1998). "Salmon Prices in France and in the UK: Does origin 
or market place matter?" Aquaculture Economics Management 2(21-30). 
  
Bailey, D. and B. W. Brorsen (1989). "Price Asymmetry in Spatial Fed Cattle Markets." 
Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 14(2): 246-252. 
  
Balke, N. S., et al. (1998). "Crude Oil and Gasoline Prices: An asymmetric Relationship?" 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Economic Review, first Quarter 38: 2-11. 
 61
  
Balke, N. S. and T. B. Fomby (1997). "Threshold cointegration." International Economic 
Review 38: 627-645. 
  
Bedrossian, A. and D. Moschos (1998). "Industrial Structure, Concentration and the 
Speed of Price Adjustment." The Journal of Industrial Economics 36: 459-475. 
  
Begg, D., et al. (2000). Economics, Sixth edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. 
  
Borenstein, S., et al. (1997). "Do Gasoline Prices respond asymmetrically to Crude Oil 
Price Changes?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 305-339. 
  
Brealey, R. A. and S. C. Myers (2003). Principles of Corporate Finance, Seventh edition, 
McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 
  
Bredahl, M. E., et al. (1979). "The elasticity of foreign demand for U.S. agricultural 
products: the importance of the price transmission elasticity." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 16: 58-63. 
  
Brittain, L. and E. M. Bull (1997). "Agreement on a Solution to "The Salmon Case"." 
  
Briz, J. and I. de Felipe (1997). Marketing margins in food products. Agro Food Marketing. 
D. I. Padberg, C. Ritson and L. M. Albisu, CABI Publishing. 
  
Brorsen, B. W. (1987). "Observations on the Journal Publication Process." North central 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 9: 315-321. 
  
Capps, O., et al. (1995). "Analysis of marketing margins in the U.S. lamb industry." 
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 24(2): 232-240. 
  
Carman, H. F. (1997). Agricultural Price Analysis. Agro Food Marketing. D. I. Padberg, C. 
Ritson and L. M. Albisu, CABI Publishing. 
  
Charron, B. and C. Richardson (2001). "French Salmon Market." Intrafish Industry Report. 
 62 
  
Enders, W. and C. W. J. Granger (1998). "Unit-root tests and asymmetric adjustment with 
an example using the term structure of interest rates." Journal of Business & Economic 
Statistics 16: 304-311. 
  
Farrel, M. J. (1952). "Irreversible Demand Functions." Econometrica 20: 171-186. 
  
Gardner, B. L. (1975). "The Farm-Retail Price spread in a Competitive Food Industry." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 57: 399-409. 
  
Gollnick, H. (1972). "Zur statistischen Schätzung und Prüfung irreveribler 
Nachfragefunktionen." Agrareirtschaft 21: 227-231. 
  
Goodwin, B. K. and D. C. Harper (2000). "Price transmission, Threshold behaviour and 
asymmetric Adjustment in the U.S Pork Sector." Journal of Agricultural & Applied 
Economics 32: 543-553. 
  
Goodwin, J. W. (1994). Marketing Margins. Agricultural price analysis and forecasting, 
John Wiley  Sons, Inc. 
  
Granger, C. W. J. and T. H. Lee (1989). "Investigation of Production, Sales and Inventory 
Relationships using Multicointegration and Non-symmetric Error Correction Models." 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 4: 135-159. 
  
Guillotreau, P. and L. Le Grel (2001). How pure are fish markets? Price instability and 
market organisation. EAFE Conference. Salerno. 
  
Guillotreau, P., et al. (2005). "Price-Cost Margins and Structural Change: Sub-Contracting 
within the Salmon Marketing Chain." Review of Development Economics 9(4): 581-597. 
  
Gujarati, D., N. (1995). Basic Econometrics, Third edition, McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
  
Guttormsen, A. G. (2002). Forecasting Salmon Prices. IntraFish Industry Report. 
  
 63
Haigh, M. S. and H. L. Bryant (2001). "The effect of barge and ocean freight price volatility 
in international grain markets." Agricultural Economics 47: 261-267. 
  
Heien, D. M. (1980). "Markup Pricing in a dynamic Model of Food Industry." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 62: 10-18. 
  
Houck, J. P. (1977). "An Approach to specifying and estimating nonreversible Functions." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 59: 570-572. 
  
Houck, J. P. (1986). Elements of Agricultural Trade Policies, MacMillan Publishing 
Company. 
  
Johnson, R. A. and G. K. Bhattacharyya (1996). Statistics: principles and methods, Third 
edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
  
Karrenbrock, J. D. (1991). "The Behaviour of Retail Gasoline Prices: Symmetric or Not?" 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 73: 19-29. 
  
Kinnucan, H. W. and O. D. Forker (1987). "Asymmetry in Farm-Retail Price Transmission 
for Major Dairy Products." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69: 286-292. 
  
Kinnucan, H. W. and Ø. Myrland (2000). "Optimal Advertising Levies with Application to 
the Norway-EU Salmon Agreement." European Review of Agricultural Economics 27(1): 
39-57. 
  
Kinnucan, H. W. and Ø. Myrland (2001). "Optimal Promotion Expenditures for Salmon: 
The importance of international Price Linkages." Aquaculture Economics and 
Management 5 (5/6): 273-288. 
  
Kinnucan, H. W. and Ø. Myrland (2002). "The Relative Impact of the Norway-EU Salmon 
Agreement: A midterm Assessment." Journal of Agricultural Economics 53(2): 195-219. 
  
Meyer, J. and S. von Cramon-Taubadel (2002a). Asymmetric price transmission: a 
survey. Xth EAAE Conference, Zaragoza. 
 64 
  
Meyer, J. and S. von Cramon-Taubadel (2002b). "Asymmetric price transmission: fact or 
artefact?" Working Paper, Institut for Agricultural Economy, University of Göttingen. 
  
Paudel, L. (2002). Exchange Rate Linked Subsidies for Non-Price Export Promotion: The 
Case of Soybeans, Auburn University. Master of Science. 
  
Peltzman, S. (2000). "Prices Rise Faster Than They Fall." Journal of Political Economy 
108(3): 466-502. 
  
Reagan, P. B. and M. I. Weitzman (1982). "Asymmetries in Price and Quantity 
Adjustments by the competitive Firm." Journal of Economic Theory 27: 410-420. 
  
Stigler, G. J. (1969). The Theory of Price, Macmillan. 
  
Tweeten, L. G. and C. L. Quance (1969). "Positive Measures of Aggregate Supply 
Elasticities: Some New Approaches." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 51: 
342-352. 
  
Von Cramon-Taubadel, S. and J.-P. Loy (1999). "The Identification of Asymmetric Price 
Transmission Processes with Integrated Time Series." Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie 
und Statistik 218(1 and 2): 85-106. 
  
Ward, R. W. (1982). "Asymmetry in Retail, Wholesale, and Shipping Point Pricing for 
Fresh Vegetables." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64: 205-212. 
  
Wolffram, R. (1971). "Positive Measures of Aggregate Supply Elasticities: Some new 
Approaches - some critical Notes." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 53: 356-
359. 
  
 
 
 65
